When Donald Trump once again suggests that the United States must “take control of” Greenland for security reasons, the reaction is often dismissal—another provocation, another headline designed to shock. Yet viewed through a geopolitical and historical lens, these statements appear far less erratic. Instead, they point to a coherent—if deeply disruptive—strategic logic.
My central argument is this: Greenland should be understood as a critical strategic asset in a United States preparing for a world after NATO. Trump’s rhetoric is not an anomaly, but a symptom of a broader shift away from the post-1945 international order.
1. Greenland and the 1951 Defence Agreement: the legal foundation
The U.S. military presence in Greenland is not accidental. It is anchored in the 1951 Greenland Defence Agreement between the United States and Denmark, concluded in the early Cold War. The agreement granted the U.S. extensive rights to establish, operate, and control military installations on Greenlandic territory, most notably Thule Air Base.
Crucially, this was a bilateral agreement, even if it was politically embedded within NATO’s collective defence framework. It gave the United States far-reaching operational freedom in the name of North Atlantic security.
Greenland’s constitutional status complicates matters further. While it is part of the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland enjoys extensive self-rule and controls key policy areas such as natural resources. Greenland is not mentioned explicitly in NATO’s founding treaty. Its protection under Article 5 is therefore indirect, derived from Denmark’s membership rather than Greenland’s own legal standing.
This ambiguity matters. It creates a situation where Greenland is strategically indispensable, legally peripheral, and politically vulnerable.
2. From Monroe Doctrine to hemispheric focus
To understand Trump’s approach to Greenland, we must revisit the Monroe Doctrine (1823). Originally intended to prevent European interference in the Americas, it asserted U.S. primacy over the Western Hemisphere.
While never formally reinstated, the doctrine’s logic has clearly resurfaced. Trump’s foreign policy rhetoric consistently signals that:
- the U.S. no longer wishes to underwrite global order,
- security responsibilities should be regionalized,
- strategic geography matters more than alliances.
This is not isolationism. It is selective retrenchment combined with regional dominance. In this framework, Greenland becomes a cornerstone of U.S. control over the North Atlantic, Arctic access, and the northern approach to North America.
The United States is not withdrawing from the world—it is reorganizing its priorities along hemispheric lines.
3. From 1945 back to 1815: the return of great-power logic
Since World War II, the international system has rested on two core principles:
- sovereign equality of states,
- multilateral institutions governing security and conflict.
Trump’s worldview departs sharply from this model. Instead, it echoes the logic of the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815), where stability was pursued by recognizing the “rights” of great powers based on size and strength, not universal legal norms.
Today, we increasingly see the world fragmenting into spheres of influence dominated by:
- the United States,
- China,
- Russia.
In such a system, the rights of smaller states—and non-state peoples—become secondary to the strategic needs of major powers. Greenland’s self-determination risks being treated as negotiable in the face of perceived security imperatives.
4. Conflict, crisis, and the 2028 election question
Some analysts speculate that escalating international conflict could be used domestically in the United States to justify extraordinary political measures, including attempts to delegitimize or obstruct the 2028 presidential election.
Legally, this argument is weak. The U.S. Constitution provides no straightforward mechanism to cancel or postpone a presidential election. Doing so would require extreme actions involving Congress and the judiciary.
Politically, however, crisis narratives matter. They can:
- polarize the electorate,
- undermine institutional trust,
- normalize exceptional executive claims.
Even if elections cannot legally be suspended, conflict rhetoric can still be weaponized internally.
5. Conclusion: Greenland first, NATO later?
My conclusion is this:
It is highly plausible that the United States seeks to secure Greenland before any potential withdrawal from NATO.
The strategic logic is clear:
- Leaving NATO would weaken the legal and political basis for U.S. military presence on allied territory.
- Greenland is essential to U.S. missile defence, Arctic strategy, and northern security.
- Without NATO, continued U.S. access to Greenland could no longer be taken for granted—especially as Greenland moves toward greater autonomy.
Seen in this light, Trump’s statements are not irrational. They are preparatory.
Secure Greenland first—then reconsider NATO.
For Europe, the Nordic countries, and Greenland itself, this raises profound questions. The issue is no longer whether Greenland is strategically important, but who decides its future—and according to what rules.
References
Avalon Project, Yale Law School.
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https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/den001.asp
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2025. Greenland wants more out of US defence agreement, minister says.
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Reuters.
2026. Trump says US needs to own Greenland to deter Russia, China.
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Reuters.
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https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposed_United_States_acquisition_of_Greenland
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monroe_Doctrine
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2026. Trump must give up fantasies about annexation, says Greenland PM.
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AP News.
2026. Greenland leaders reject U.S. control push.
https://apnews.com/article/61eeb97b7199548e3aa13ef9f5c9d545